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  • Rethinking What a Trump-Putin Summit May Achieve and Why


    by Gibert Doctorow, Ph.D.


    The rethinking in the headline is a reversal of my course, not that of the two presidents named.  As recently as a week ago, I was criticizing colleagues for advocating a US-Russia summit, saying that Trump was not ready for it, that his pursuing it could end badly for him and for our common cause of easing global tensions, which is détente spelled out in simple English.

    However, there are unmistakable signs that preparations for such a summit are well under way and may occur as early as the second week in July at a meeting in Europe that may precede by several days Trump’s participation in the next NATO gathering of heads of state in Brussels on 11-12 July. I will explain below the tea leaves I have been reading before making this prediction.

    Now that the die is cast, the task of people of good will is to attempt to understand what is driving this process forward and to help to make the most of the opportunities presented, to help prevent the chances of a shipwreck, which are real.

    What concretely can we do?  Certainly not try to give advice to President Trump.  All signs are that he takes policy advice from very, very few people and decidedly not from commentators in the media and/or intellectuals. To believe otherwise is to indulge in exaggerated self-esteem. Moreover, it is his very imperviousness to the opinions of others that explains what we are about to witness.

    There remains the important task of preparing the general public and more particularly Congress for what is likely to result from a Trump-Putin meeting.  If Donald Trump is ready to walk the tight-rope, the least we can do is hold out a net.


    * * * *


    I say that a summit in the near future look likely, in part because that is suggested in several articles appearing recently in the Washington Post, in The Wall Street Journal, in The New Yorker making reference to unidentified contacts in the administration.  In part, I base it on less obvious clues that speak to the vestigial Kremlinologist in me. One is the repeat broadcast this morning on Vesti/Rossiya-1 of an interview with Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz that took place just before Vladimir Putin’s state visit on 6 June. Vienna has been mentioned as a possible venue for any such summit, and the interview makes plain why the country would be so very suitable as the site of a summit – namely Kurz’s populist and Euro-skeptic policies that are so highly appreciated by both Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin. One additional clue is that Henry Kissinger is said to be in Moscow right now, and Henry has been an adviser to Trump on policy to Russia ever since the 2016 campaign. He has been the voice urging an accommodation with Russia for a variety of geopolitical strategic reasons.

    The timing for the coming summit is said to be during Donald Trump’s July visit to Europe for the annual NATO gathering of heads of state in Brussels.  Considering what happened at the G-7 meeting in Canada a week ago, it would be very much in line with Trump’s behavior to meet with Putin just before the NATO summit so as to deflate the self-importance of the allies in advance and defeat any thought of resistance to the changes in global politics that he is undertaking with a wrecking ball.

    The possibility of Vienna serving as host to such a meeting surely was on the agenda of Vladimir Putin’s state visit.  Vienna has the advantage of being a neutral country, and it served as the meeting place of a US President and Russian (Soviet) leader before – at the remarkable encounter of John Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev back in  1961.

    The likelihood that Henry Kissinger has urged this summit on Trump and is now fulfilling the mission of a go-between during his visit to Moscow ostensibly to watch the World Cup games raises questions  about Trump’s objectives.  I have noted before that Kissinger’s advice to Trump during the electoral campaign to reach an accommodation with Moscow was aimed at decoupling the budding Russia-China strategic partnership that has undone all that Nixon and Kissinger achieved in the 1970s.  I have also noted that Putin rejected this conceptualization of the path to normalized relations with the US when Trump’s emissaries put it to him early in the spring of 2017. Putin is very loyal to his friends and would never turn on Chinese President Xi for the sake of an invitation to the White House. After that setback, Kissinger appeared to have disappeared from the Trump’s entourage.

    Evidence of Kissinger’s return to favor came as recently as a week ago when Trump reportedly said behind closed doors at the G-7 meeting that Crimea is rightfully Russia’s.  That is half of the new equation for normalization of relations now being attributed to Kissinger by hearsay:  the other side of the equation being that in return Russia would withdraw its support to the rebellion in Donbass against the Ukrainian authorities.  This exchange also will never be accepted by Russia if it is formally presented. To abandon Donbass to the not so tender mercy of Ukrainian nationalists and revanchists would be political suicide for Putin given the strength of feeling on the subject among his supporters. But if a meeting is agreed, there are also several other key issues which might fill the agenda to the mutual satisfaction of both sides, in particular on Syria and on re-starting arms control negotiations.

    There have been rumors that the United States is seeking a de facto if not de jure partition of Syria whereby its control over the Kurdish territory east of the Euphrates River is recognized by the Russians. The logic for this U.S. interest may well be related more to containing Iran than to depriving the Assad government of territory, population and hydrocarbon resources.  Figuratively the American zone would be a bulwark against Iranian infiltration of Syria and Iran’s enjoying unchallenged military access to the Israeli border.  Considering the obvious understandings between Netanyahu and Putin over Iranian operations on Syrian soil, it is quite possible that Russia would agree to the US proposal as part of a bigger negotiation over improving bilateral relations.

    As for resuming arms control talks, that already figured in Donald Trump’s congratulatory phone call to Vladimir Putin two days after his election victory on 18 March in which he said they should meet in the near future because the arms race looked as if it were getting out of hand.


    All accounts of the President’s decision to seek a meeting with Putin in July indicate that he is doing this over the objections of every one of his advisers.  Put another way, he would not appear to have many resources at hand at the moment for a solid preparation of the planned summit.


    Normally, the Russians would not accept a meeting at the top without such preparation. However, in light of what just happened in the Singapore summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un, which also had close to no preparation and ended in a one-page, 4-point statement of intentions which was swallowed by the American establishment and media upon Trump’s return home, the Kremlin may well have decided that this is the only way forward with an American President under siege from his own administration not to mention the federal bureaucracy.


    I can envision a Letter of Intent signed by Trump and Putin in Vienna that has three points. Two are the points sketched above. The third could be a quite unexceptional statement on Ukraine that would conceal a significant change in US policy given in verbal assurances that would change the dynamics in US-Russian relations. Namely the sides could agree to take measures to ensure that both Kiev and the breakaway republics begin at once to honor the Minsk Accords.  Behind this anodyne formula would be a US commitment to force the hand of Poroshenko or to have him removed and replaced by someone who will do what is necessary to achieve a political settlement with Donbass. In return, the Russians would ensure quick deployment of a UN or other reputable peace keeping force in the Donbass at the lines of separation of forces and at the Russian Ukrainian border.


    The Letter of Intent would be a start, would give a new direction to the bilateral relations and would open the way to creation of working groups and restoration of lines of communication that Barack Obama foolishly severed following the tainted advice of his Neocon staff at the State Department.


    Restarting arms control negotiations should take in more than propping up existing agreements that are either coming to term or are being systematically violated (agreement on short to intermediate range missiles). From Trump’s remarks on the new arms race, it would be entirely logical for him now to accept Vladimir Putin’s invitation to discuss the new technology strategic weapons systems such as Russia is now rolling out, as well as cyber warfare. They would also reopen talks on the US missile defense installations on land in Poland and Romania and at sea off the Russian coasts which gave rise to Russia’s development of what are called invincible offensive systems in response.

    Such a one-page Letter of Intent could be sold to a skeptical or even hostile Congress if arms control heads the list.  The Open Letter to Rex Tillerson by four US Senators, 3 Democrats and 1 Independent (Bernie Sanders) in early March urging immediate arms control talks showed that Vladimir Putin’s speech of 1 March on how Russia has restored full nuclear parity with the United States could break through the otherwise blind partisanship on Capitol Hill when questions of national survival are on the table. (See )

    One topic which will surely not be on the agenda of any Trump-Putin summit is the ending of sanctions. Trump's hands are bound by US law passed by Congress in August 2017. And Putin has said repeatedly that the US imposed the sanctions and it is up to the US to remove them without any negotiation on the subject. For possible relief on sanctions, it is better to watch Brussels, where internal dissension has been growing and where disillusionment with American leadership on this and many other matters may finally break the habits of servitude to US directives.

    If one thing is clear during the Trump presidency, it is that the rule books on many aspects of international relations are being rewritten.  Impromptu summits ending in sketchy letters of intent may be the new norm in this period of transition.

    © Gilbert Doctorow, 2018

          * * * *

    Gilbert Doctorow is an independent political analyst based in Brussels. His latest book, Does the United States Have a Future? was published on 12 October 2017. Both paperback and e-book versions are available for purchase on and all affiliated Amazon websites worldwide. See the recent professional review    For a video of the book presentation made at the National Press Club, Washington, D.C. on 7 December 2017 see

  • Kissinger’s Fingerprints on the Trump Security Doctrine, 2017


    by Gilbert Doctorow, Ph.D.


    Those who believe that Donald Trump is witless, a “moron” to quote Rex Tillerson, were proven wrong on December 18 when the President released his National Security Strategy (NSS).  Those who believe that the Deep State operates entirely on its own, without taking any cues from incoming presidents were also proven wrong.

    Going through this 68 page document issued in keeping with tradition by each administration at regular intervals, I find very important changes in language from where official America has been operating these past 25 years suggesting that, after all, Henry Kissinger has made a come-back and may well be this president’s mentor on international affairs, as seemed to be the case during the electoral campaign and into the first months following his inauguration, before the removal of Flynn and the running aground of Trump’s foreign policy initiative in March.

    In saying that, I am speaking not about the Henry Kissinger who was the implementer of Nixon’s détente with Russia or of Nixon’s great rapprochement with China that led to an informal partnership in managing world affairs of mutual interest. Nor am I speaking about Kissinger Unbound:  the strident exponent of Realism and critic of Idealism who authored the master work Diplomacy in 1994, when there was still no road map to post-Cold War American foreign policy and he hoped pragmatism would finally prevail over ideology, when he hoped that he would return to a position of influence from the decades in the wilderness that began with the Reagan presidency and Neocon ascendancy.


    What we have here is the contrite Kissinger who made his peace with the unavoidable political prejudices of our day and made certain that every appeal to national interest was accompanied by due genuflection before the altar of national values, Kissinger, the author of World Order (2015).

     We are told the following at the very first page of the Introduction: “[This] is a strategy of principled realism that is guided by outcomes, not ideology."

    Kissinger’s concepts as leading exponent of the Realist School of International  Relations permeate the document. We find here mention of “balance of powers,” a key Realist School term. In the NSS, it is used in matter-of-fact manner, whereas the notion had in the first Obama administration been condemned by Joe Biden, by Hillary Clinton as “passé,” as so very 19th century, an antiquarian object that is inadmissible in our modern age. We were told by our Liberal Interventionists that we are now living in the age of “smart power,” the latest version of “soft power” invented by Harvard professor and Democratic Party thinker Joseph Nye.

     In the NSS, there is the notion that states have always been in competitive relationships, are so today and will be so far into the future: the challenge is to position oneself to win in the competition. 

    By the same token, the given text is devoid of all the Cold War vintage legalistic argumentation against Russia or China that Kissinger found so galling and denounced in his memoirs.  The Dulles brothers’ thinking was still going strong under Bush and Obama. But lawyer statesmen are well and truly buried in Trump’s NSS. There is not a word about our competitors violating international law, only about their going against our interests in pursuit of their own interests. 

    Equally telling, there is not a word in the NSS document about malicious foreign leaders and their evil regimes. The personalization of politics, the denigration of foreign presidents and prime ministers that has characterized most official American pronouncements on international affairs these past 25 years and prepared the ground for open and covert attempts at regime change – all of that is absent. This is entirely in keeping with the overarching concept of Realism, namely that national interest is in the DNA of nations and not merely the whim of whoever has come to power.

    Moreover, when you characterize leaders of other states as evil, when you call Vladimir Putin a "Hitler," as Hillary Clinton did  a number of times during her campaign speeches, then you close the door on negotiations and have entered the antechamber of WWIII.

    What we see in the NSS is prioritization and true strategic vision as opposed to ideological cant and ad hoc responses to global developments, or, as one might have expected from Trump, given his reputation for a disorganized mind, some grab-bag of issues to be pursued, starting with the hot ones in his tweets, Iran and North Korea.  No, the stress in the NSS is on competition with two great powers, China and Russia, both described as revisionist, meaning that they want to re-claim their positions of influence at the world’s board of governors at the expense of the sole surviving superpower, the United States.

     This is in itself a wholly new appreciation. With respect to Russia, for example, Obama had foolishly told us it was just a “regional power.”  Putin replied with amused irony: which region? But the point was lost on Washington. Now we find that the United States is engaged in a hot competition with both China and Russia in virtually every corner of the globe.


    Fact versus Fake


    Over the past 18 months there has been a lot of talk in public space about “fake news” and about lies coming from high places.  The former has been the repeated message of Trump in his attacks on CNN, the BBC and other mainstream media.  The latter has been the push-back from the media and political opposition to Trump. By way of example, to this day a regular feature item in The Washington Post is a fact check on whatever Trump says, or Pinocchio index.

     The refreshing thing about the NSS is that it is fact oriented.  This is in keeping with the tenets of the Realist School of International Relations.

     Russia is very correctly identified as a military threat, first and foremost.

     “Russia is investing in new military capabilities, including nuclear systems that remain the most significant existential threat to the United States…”

     To be sure, the NSS also carries the fake news accusations against Russia for political destabilization of democracies through information and cyber war. This is part of a shared authorship issue which I will mention in a moment.

     China is identified in the NSS as a growing military power with great potential:

     “It is building the most capable and well-funded military in the world, after our own. Its nuclear arsenal is growing and diversifying.”

     But otherwise China’s threat to United States interests is shown primarily in terms of economic aggrandizement and unfair trading practices that do harm to the United States economy. The Chinese economic expansion is noted in all continents.

     The competitive pressure from both China and Russia taken together present a formidable challenge, which is described in almost but not quite value neutral terms:

     “…after being dismissed as a phenomenon of an earlier century, great power competition returned. China and Russia began to reassert their influence regionally and globally. Today, they are fielding military capabilities designed to deny America access in times of crisis and to contest our ability to operate freely in critical commercial zones during peacetime. In short, they are contesting our geopolitical advantages and trying to change the international order in their favor.”

     I would qualify that generalization as correct, and I commend its neutral tone.  Similarly Kissingerian is the description of what our yellow press likes to call “hybrid warfare.” In the NSS that is defined as “operating below the threshold of open military conflict and at the edges of international law.”  Note: “at the edges” not in violation of international law.  Note, too, the follow-on criticism of American policy-makers for having a hard time walking and chewing gum at the same time:

    “China, Russia and other state and non-state actors recognize that the United States often views the world in binary terms, with states being either “at peace” or “at war,” when it is actually an arena of continuous competition.”

     This remark comes straight from the Master.  So, too, is the call for sophistication in pursuing the overarching strategy in regional contexts:

     “The United States must tailor our approaches to different regions of the world to protect U.S. national interests. We require integrated regional strategies that appreciate the nature and magnitude of threats, the intensity of competitions, and the promise of available opportunities, all in the context of local political, economic, social, and historical realities.”


    Those realities can be appreciated only if the relevant area studies are sustained, which ceased to be the case in the United States years ago, when universal values hijacked foreign policy and regional differences were dismissed by the political bosses. 

    As for any contradictions in the text, we must remember that Trump is surrounded by officials who are carriers of the world view and prejudices of the preceding 25 years. Partly they are the holdovers whom he could not fire lest the bureaucracy be totally depopulated. Partly they are his own appointees as he sought to fill posts the easy way, without confronting the Senate on each and every appointee. We know that one officer in his National Security Council was responsible for the NSS text, and not all that she wrote was red-penciled. However, the dominant lines of the NSS were clearly written by others, who are close to Trump, and presumably close to his mentor Kissinger. So there are unavoidable wrinkles.




    The following pearl says in eloquent, Kissingerian terms what Donald Trump has been saying in his more tongue-tied way ever since he entered the presidential race:

      “We are…realistic and understand that the American way of life cannot be imposed upon others, nor is it the inevitable culmination of progress.”

     The NSS tells us that the United States will stand by the values of its Founding Fathers, will seek to be a beacon of light and hope to the world on behalf of democracy, the initiative and enterprise of citizens and rule of law, but it will not impose its ways on others.  This is what Trump said on the campaign trail, but here the notion is given more specific form. 

     The Neoconservative-Liberal Interventionist claptrap that has had a monopoly position in all International Relations literature and US government documents for the past 25 years is stripped away.  The theses of our post-Cold War secular religion, and in particular the conviction that only democratic countries can live in peace, are almost entirely absent from the NSS. The metrics of democracy promotion have been removed. What remains is the feeble statement that authoritarian countries, countries that do not allow women to participate equally for example, deprive themselves of major sources of economic strength and well-being.


    This is not a small matter.  To be sure, over the past 25 years the Neoconservative-Liberal Interventionist claptrap has been wrapped around a core of Realism that promoted not only U.S. ideological preferences but also U.S. hard power and economic interests.  But the claptrap was dangerous because the democratic and free market values, claimed to be universal values, were by definition not amenable to compromise. They were seen as the “End of History,” the ultimate berth of the ship of humankind. This justified the demotion of diplomacy to a weak supportive role for military policy. 

    Put in other words, a foreign policy based on universal values can only lead to war. However, when the driving force of foreign policy is precisely national interest, then diplomacy has a chance to thrive. By definition, national interest is subject to compromise based on unsentimental calculation of power equations.


    Words count


    Analysis of the NSS requires that we pay attention not only to concepts but to vocabulary. The key words in the NSS is “competitor” or “rival,” although we also find in the text the substitute word “adversary.”  “Competitor” is the word applied repeatedly to China and Russia. It is perfect for the purposes of Realist School foreign policy, precisely because it is descriptive, not judgmental, and not emotional.  The text reads: “Competition does not always mean hostility, nor does it inevitably lead to conflict…”

     The word “adversary,” also found in the text, is more troubling, because it is seen by some as a synonym for “enemy,” which in turn has within it the semantic load of “hostile.” These terms are emotive, not descriptive and are not far removed from the “axis of evil” thinking brought into public space by Ronald Reagan and picked up and propagated by George W. Bush.  Happily, in the National Security Strategy “adversary” is not spelled out, not applied to specific countries. 


    Unredacted mention of “authoritarian regimes” appears in the NSS here and there. but this donkey tail is also not pinned on specific targets.  The term stands in contradiction with the Realist School’s indifference to the nature of regimes and sensitivity only to raw power. This betrays the obvious fact that this new Security doctrine is the work of at least two agencies:  the National Security Council and unnamed individuals in the circle of the President who had the final say on the text.  Trump could not dispense with staff whom law and custom oblige him to retain but he could overrule them, resulting in the contradictions that appear in many places in this document.


    Words and Deeds


    As I have indicated in the foregoing, the thinking underpinning policy has changed dramatically in this new Security doctrine compared to the thinking highlighted by the presidential administrations of the past 20 years or so.  However, when we look at the recommendations for implementation, at the priorities, it is also clear that there will be no big changes in day to day US policy because, as I noted, the thinking behind US policy has always had both Realist and Idealist components to it. The question is the balance between the two and which is on the surface.

     For example, with regard to sanctions directed against Russia and the U.S. attempts to isolate and penalize the country especially since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, it is clear from this new doctrine that the sanctions may remain in place in perpetuity.  Not because of any violation of international law, as U.S. diplomacy has maintained loudly in every imaginable forum.  But simply because the United States reserves the right to apply these tools against every power which works against its interests, and in particular “to ensure that regions of the world are not dominated by one power.”  This matter-of-fact declaration violates directly the entire logic of the WTO and free trade.  But the notion of preventing the formation of local hegemons, whether Russia in its “near abroad” or China in Southeast Asia, has always been a principle of U.S. policy, though rarely in the past 25 years has it been stated so baldly.

     The change in justification from violator of human rights or of the territorial integrity of sovereign states to “acting against US interests” is of very great importance. This removes all justification for other countries to apply sanctions against whomever the United States is punishing except as their own interests are also threatened by the offender.  In the case of the European Union and Russia, national interests speak to the opposite policy – namely for full normalization of relations with Russia.


    It is also worth noting that the NSS makes clear that the US policy of fighting Russian energy dominance in Europe going back to the second term of Bill Clinton will continue unabated. But whereas until Trump that card was played by seeking to stymie Russia’s paths to market via gas pipelines, and to bring in gas from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and other non-Russian sources via pipelines that do not cross Russian territory, the new game is to promote America’s own shale gas to displace Russia in its traditional markets.

     “As a growing supplier of energy resources, technologies and services around the world, the United States will help our allies and partners become more resilient against those that use energy to coerce”   - sums up this policy neatly.




    Without any question, expanding and upgrading U.S. military forces is seen by the authors of the NSS as one of the key tasks to ensure American security, alongside growing the domestic economy so as to support this burden.  However, the NSS makes an intelligent, almost impassioned argument in favor of “competitive diplomacy.”  And even the platitudes set down here have potential value if they will be implemented with any consistency:

     “Diplomacy sustains dialogue and fosters areas of cooperation with competitors. It reduces the risk of costly miscommunication.”

     Indeed, at a time when lines of communication with Russia built over decades have been severed unilaterally as “punishment” for its alleged transgressions, this is a powerful argument for a re-think in Congress and at Foggy Bottom.

    Nonetheless, it bears mention that the NSS speaks of negotiations being carried on "from a position of strength." That phrase also is a long-standing entry in the Kissingerian inventory of concepts.


    How has the NSS been seen by commentators inside and outside the United States


    Given the contradictory elements in this National Security Strategy, given the obvious contradictions between the many high-minded declarations of principle it contains and the actual words and deeds of the sitting President over the past year, it should come as no surprise that observers within and outside the United States have interpreted the document variously. I will comment on just three of them here.


    The Wall Street Journal was cautiously sympathetic to the key role given to economic and trade policies in the new national security strategy. The paper gave a factual account of highlights in the document, starting with its focus on the challenges presented by China and Russia. It attributes oversight of the project to Trump’s national security adviser Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster and one of his deputies, Nadia Schadlow, whose writings are reflective of the Washington Consensus thinking of the Department of Defense and private research institutions in which she served before joining the NSC.  Who may have actually written the NSS text is a matter about which they do not speculate.


    The anti-Trump liberal journal of commentary The Atlantic takes a less generous direction in “Trump’s National Security Strategy is Decidely Non-Trumpian.”  They conclude that the plan “highlights the wide gulf between what the president says and what he does.”   However, that view comes from the attention they direct to the values passages in the NSS such as “The United States rejects bigotry, ignorance, and oppression…etc.”  They insist on Trump’s violation of the principles enshrined in the Bill of Rights, cited in the NSS, by his travel ban and “targeting of Muslim-majority countries.”  This is a fair line of attack, but one which has little relevance to the main contours of the security doctrine as I have delineated them.


    The Washington Post calls attention to the hard line on China which, they say, is mentioned 23 times in the doctrine

     In Russia, the new NSS immediately became a lively subject for discussion on the political talk shows, where it was generally viewed with ironic bemusement.  For its part, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a negative commentary, noting that the document’s idea of negotiating “from a position of strength” is a policy line that is not conducive to “constructive partnership on an equal basis for the joint solution of existing problems, but to confrontation.” They go on to say that the United States is “trying to preserve the noticeably weakened American domination in the international arena at any price.”

    This official Russian appraisal chooses to overlook Kissinger's long association with the offending phrase. After all, Kissinger is treated with high respect by the Kremlin to this day. But more generally, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs ignores the obvious switch in principles guiding U.S. policy from Idealism to Realism, although Russia itself builds its foreign policy primarily on the principles of the Realist School and should be pleased by what now will be a level playing field.  I would therefore characterize the Kremlin’s reaction as mere posturing that will change quickly as opportunities to enter into talks with Washington materialize.


    Kissinger for better or worse


    Surely some readers of this essay will express dismay that I put a positive value on Kissinger’s having influenced Trump’s security doctrine. Among many sincere, educated, right-thinking Americans, there is the belief that Henry Kissinger is a war criminal. His role in conducting the Vietnam War, and in particular events like the ferocious Christmas bombing of Hanoi in 1972  and the spread of the war into Laos and Cambodia still earlier are not forgotten or forgiven by his detractors to this day.

    It is also true that Henry Kissinger has spent the second half of his long life making amends for the misdeeds of the first half.  And in the present day environment, it is reassuring that we have at the side of Donald Trump not only generals known by their sobriquet “Mad Dog” but also a civilian expert with deep experience in statecraft and appreciation of how far you can go in applying pressure to the likes of Russia or China before all hell breaks loose.


    © Gilbert Doctorow, 2017


         * * * *


    Gilbert Doctorow is an independent political analyst based in Brussels. His latest book, Does the United States Have a Future? was published on 12 October 2017. Both paperback and e-book versions are available for purchase on and all affiliated Amazon websites worldwide. See the recent professional review    For a video of the book presentation made at the National Press Club, Washington, D.C. on 7 December 2017 see

  • Putin – Trump meeting in Hamburg: what paradigm for development of US-Russian relations should we look for?


    by Gilbert Doctorow, Ph.D,


    The much-anticipated first face-to-face meeting of Presidents Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin finally took place on the sidelines of the G-20 Summit in Hamburg on July 7. The attention of the world and even of the other participants of Summit was so riveted to the Trump-Putin meeting, and the Summit schedule was so interrupted by that meeting, that clever tongues are speaking of the G-20 having taken place at the sidelines of the Trump-Putin talks.

    The two big news items to emerge in U.S. media concerned a) the length of the meeting and b) Trump’s having raised the issue of Russian meddling in the 2016 presidential campaign, thus addressing the demands for confronting the Kremlin on the issue that came out of the hysterical “Russiagate” campaign of Trump’s detractors and political enemies.

    Indeed, the meeting went on for two hours and fifteen minutes, as opposed to the 25 minutes advised in advance by the White House. There were a total of six participants:  the two presidents, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, his counterpart Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, and the interpreters.This is important, because Trump dispensed with the large delegation of "advisers" and Russophobes, like Fiona Hill, whom he was urged to take along to the meeting to keep him on the straight and narrow.

    As for Russian hacking and other alleged interference in the U.S. elections, we are told that the subject took up 40 minutes, nearly a third of the meeting time. The New York Times  confides that the discussion was tense and heated.   In answer to journalists’ questions following the meeting, Sergei Lavrov and then later Vladimir Putin himself expressed confidence that the Russian’s vehement denials of any involvement were persuasive and were accepted. So far, the Trump camp has been quiet on the persuasiveness.

    Regrettably, this very tightly focused attention of U.S. media has left unreported what was actually achieved during the meeting.  To be sure, that was not much of substance, because substance requires detailed advance preparation by teams from both sides, something which could not and did not occur due to the intense pressure of Trump’s political opponents and even of several of his own advisers, who wanted no meeting at all or a confrontational meeting as opposed to constructive meeting if any. 

    That being said, there was one concrete piece of business which Lavrov mentioned in his press briefing immediately afterwards: the creation of a joint U.S.-Russian center for deconfliction in Jordan, where the U.S. military coordination of the Syrian theater is located, to look after the implementation of a local pacification and return to civilian life in the southwest region of Syria. Moreover, the supervision on the ground of this deconfliction will be performed by Russian military police.  That all appears to be a very positive development, adding to the 6 deconfliction areas in Syria that were agreed in Astana at meetings of all warring parties and are under the guaranty of Turkey, Iran and Russia.

     It would be still better if there had been some progress on the more dangerous zone of eastern and southeastern Syria along the Euphrates, where U.S. backed forces of the Free Syrian Army have clashed with Assad’s forces and where the U.S. shot down a Syrian bomber a couple of weeks ago, causing the Russians to cut military hot lines and to threaten to target all U.S. and Allied planes flying West of the Euphrates.

    We also are informed that the United States will now be taking an active role in pressing for the implementation of the Minsk Accords for the sake of a properly observed cease-fire and a political solution. A point man for relations with Ukraine has been named.  In practice, this will likely mean applying pressure on Kiev to live up to its commitments – on voting in the Donbass, on decentralization….

    There was also an agreement to set up a joint body to deal with cyber security so as to ensure there will be no possible attacks on electoral processes in either country.  The Russians, in particular, seek such cooperation in the knowledge that cyber attacks are considered a causus belli by the Americans.

    More generally, what seems to have been achieved at the Putin-Trump meeting was agreement on procedures to begin a normalization of bilateral relations, including the early appointment of new ambassadors in both capitals.  No agreements on anything specific as yet, but the identification of outstanding issues and the start of assignment of responsibility on both sides to enter into detailed discussion to find solutions.   If followed up, that could turn out to be a turning point in relations.

    Before the meeting took place, journalists and pundits were looking for scenarios from the past which might characterize the emerging relationship of the two presidents.  Optimists, in particular, spoke of the enormously important example set by Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan, which led to very significant agreements on arms limitation and to the resolution of the underlying cause of the Cold War: Europe’s division into Russian and Allied spheres of control. Donald Trump’s repeated indications on the campaign trail that he believed Putin was someone with whom he could do business was redolent of Reagan’s and Margaret Thatcher’s views of Gorbachev.

    But I think that this conceptualization of what may lie ahead is deceptive and a cul de sac.   Today there is no Soviet Union, no Russian empire in Europe and nothing of the kind to resolve. Moreover, with all of the negative associations for today’s Kremlin coming from the naïve and unjustified trust of Gorbachev in the good intentions and fair play of his interlocutors, references to that political duo is a nonstarter for the Russian side. 



    Instead, I see the frame of reference for what lies ahead in the Nixon-Brezhnev detente.  One of the great implementers of that détente was Henry Kissinger, whose Realpolitik underlies Trump’s America First thinking.  And Kissinger himself has been very visible in the Trump foreign policy circle.  He was with Trump when he received Sergei Lavrov and Ambassador Kislyak in the Oval Office a couple of months ago.  He was Trump’s messenger to Putin a week ago when he arrived in Moscow and was taken to a tête-à-tête with the Russian President that Russian state television considered newsworthy.  


    Nixon-era détente was all about peaceful coexistence between two world super-powers pursuing their own national interest, not about cozy friendship.


    We do not have today an ideological divide driving the competition of these two powers, but we do have heightened and currently malicious or malignant competitiveness that can run amok. The objective is to agree on national interests of the sides, a polite way of saying the unspeakable in American politics, "spheres of influence."  At the highest level of abstraction, we are talking about an agreement on world governance.


    In the heyday of detente, and even as late as 1978 or so, Brezhnev offered Nixon a condominium:  if we and you agree, said Leonid Il’ich, no one else in the world will dare raise a finger.    The Americans did not buy it.  Nixon could not have accepted that even if he wished to because Congress would never agree.   Putin is not offering such a condominium, but instead is offering mutual responsibility for governance through the UN and other fora like the G20.  Maybe, just maybe Trump will go for it.


    * * * *

     In trying to understand how the Russians have assessed the Putin-Trump meeting, as usual I have found the country's highest level political talk show, Sunday Evening with Vladimir Soloviev, to be an invaluable aid.

    Opinion is divided between politicians and think tank intellectuals who are openly optimistic and those who are guardedly optimistic.

    The openly optimistic believe that Trump and Putin got off to a good start, with good "personal chemistry" which promises an improvement of bilateral relations. And in general they believe that Russia did well from the encounter, with the eyes of the world directed respectfully at their President. The world had returned to the good old days when everyone looked to Washington and Moscow as the arbiters of global stresses.

    The guardedly optimistic believe that the meeting does not hold the promise of good relations, but marks the end of deterioration and so averts war, which otherwise was quite possibly on the horizon.  The meeting and its duration highlight the understanding in the United States that maintaining working relations and open dialogue with Russia is essential for world peace. But the sanctions will remain, and the major power blocs of the United States and Europe, Russia and China will vie for influence and keep their distance from one another for many years to come.

    It also bears mention that the Russians were bemused by the insistent implicit and sometimes explicit criticism of Trump from American journalists and other attendees of the Summit for being incompetent, something of a deranged fool.  No one in living memory had witnessed such contempt for the Commander in Chief from his own fellow citizens.  This fact curbed Russian expectations that anything promised by Trump could be realized.


    * * * *

    Apart from the meeting of the Russian and American presidents and from the obvious isolation of the US delegation at the conclusion of the summit when the other 19 members joined in a common statement reaffirming their countries’ commitment to the Paris Climate Change treaty from which Trump has withdrawn the United States, the other main aspect of the G-20 in Hamburg that captured the headlines of U.S. and European press was the violence of the demonstrators who, as is now customary at such events, came to curse globalization and the free trade pacts that G-20 members have traditionally subscribed to.  More than 100 German police fell victim to the demonstrators actions.

    The very curious thing is that no one from the opponents of globalization took notice of an extraordinary fact:  that Donald Trump is the first American President ever to have taken a policy stand AGAINST globalization. If logic had any place in these political struggles, the demonstrators should have been lined up to shake Trump’s hand, wish him well in deconstructing the trade pacts, and asked for autographs. 


    But logic and politics often part company, and the demonstrators ‘did their thing’ without a nod of any kind to their American ally in the White House.




    © Gilbert Doctorow, 2017



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    Gilbert Doctorow is an independent political analyst based in Brussels. His latest book Does Russia Have a Future? was published in August 2015. His forthcoming book Does the United States Have a Future? will be published on 1 September 2017.